Biomedical Ethics: Death and Dying (Life Sciences Essay)

Biomedical Ethics: Death and Dying
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Biomedical Ethics: Death and Dying
Euthanasia has been a subject of debate with some people arguing in favor of it whereas others opposing the practice. Most arguments have been based on medical ethics. Proponents of assisted suicide always cite the principle of autonomy, claiming that this principle gives the patients the right to make decisions, which includes the right to die. They have also suggested that assisted suicide prevents pain and suffering for terminally ill patients. In this context, proponents say that a patient should die with dignity instead of living them to suffer until death. However, those against assisted euthanasia contend that this practice denies the patients their inalienable right to life. According to the opponents, the primary goal of healthcare professionals is to improve the well-being of the patients by alleviating pain. As such, physicians need to ensure they do everything they could to resuscitate the patient rather than causing harm. Ethically, euthanasia is wrong when considering the principles of medical ethics such as benevolence and non-magnificence that require physicians not to cause harm to the patients. Assisting patients to die violates these principles.
Vallemain’s argument against the right to die focuses on the aspects of dignity and autonomy. His first argument follows a question of whether anyone has a moral obligation to be assisted or permitted to die. Velleman (1992) uses the words like dignity and autonomy to explain his stance. According to Velleman (1992), different treatments are believed to infringe the dignity of a patient or hold them in a state without dignity. Equally, the right to autonomy requires physicians to respect the wish of the patients. Such wish includes that of dying. However, these clams may or may not bear the truth. As such, Velleman (1992) urges that when evaluating such claims, it is not appropriate to assume that the terms ‘dignity’ and ‘autonomy’ always express similar concepts or carry the same normative force.
Speaking of the dignity by virtue, Velleman (1992) does not invoke anything that needs the ability to walk unaided, or feed oneself. Thus, the dignity adopted in deliberations of medical ethics cannot be the position whose argument on ethical concern is significant to Kantian theory. Therefore, it is imperative to ask whether this dignity carries a value that is worth protection. In this context, Velleman (1992) contends that the term dignity is often used to exalt the obsession of cultures with physical strength, independence and youth. For that reason, he claims that the dignity defined by these values is a dignity not worth having because it is incompatible with healthcare.
Velleman (1992) has similar qualms about the values that autonomy expresses. He outlines that autonomy can only become valuable in two ways. One way is by refusing to adopt any axiom that the patient could not sensibly support. In that case, people value the patient’s self determination ability earned through respect. People respect the autonomy of the patient by co...