Terrorism, Moral Equality of Combatants, and the Responsibility Dilemma

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Philosophy: Ethics and Society
Question 1
Samuel Scheffler has written conclusively about what he refers to as 'standard cases' of terrorism and how perpetrators use victims to achieve other ulterior ends. Scheffler states that in 'the standard cases' of terrorism, the terrorists are systematic in their operations. They will target "a more or less random group of civilians or non-combatants," killing or injuring them, with the ultimate goal being to produce fear in a larger group of people. It is through the induction of this fear that they hope to threaten or else erode 'the quality or stability of an existing social order.". The primary victims are those murdered or injured, while the secondary victims are the larger group of people with whom these events have cultivated fear. In this manner, the use of fear and terror is a primary determinant that differentiates standard cases from the rest. In this case, the initial victim is implicated as "means to a means; that is, they are treated not just as a means to an end but as a means to a means: that is, they are treated as a means to an end of treating the secondary victims as a means to an end.".[Samuel, Scheffler. "Is Terrorism Morally Distinctive?" Journal of Political Philosophy 14.1 (2006), p.5] [Ibid, p.9]
Personally, this argument is convincing. First and foremost, people are likely to perceive threats faster than opportunities probably because their survival is at stake. Consequently, they are compelled to formulate strategies that will minimize their chances of being caught during such circumstances. They do this out of the fear they have developed as a result of terrorist activities. Fear insinuates the need for survival, which is why it becomes an instrument to determine people's decisions. Secondly, terrorists want their activities to elicit the most significant impact possible. The magnitude of the event determines the level of fear that the public will become acquainted with if the entire activity is a success.
Question 2
First and foremost, McMahan argues that "there is nothing morally special about war." His position arises from the evident position that the individual fighting the war is doing so on behalf of the political collective. Nevertheless, this status does not give the person "special permissions to harm that are more extensive than those that are enjoyed by individuals who do not act on behalf of a collective." A more developed analysis of this idea is that it is absurd to think that people who are fighting for a just cause and, in this case, legitimized self- or other-defense are moral equals to those who are unjustly attacking them. When unjust combatants threaten just combatants in war, they are liable to defensive harm because they are morally responsible for posing unjust threats. In contrast, the just combatants do nothing to render any of their usual rights forfeit. This predisposition demonstrates that the moral equality thesis looks false. It is false because there is no significant difference between the combatants' lives and ordinary people in ordinary life. In essence, the combatants' actions are highly predicated upon the collective, which could include stat...