Is Abortion Moral and How Thomson Would be Criticize on His A Defense of Abortion

A Defense of Abortion
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A Defense of Abortion
In this essay, I will argue that abortion is morally permissible when a pregnancy threatens the life of the mother. There are two main premises that I will rely upon to make this conclusion. First, according to Thomson’s logic, the right to life is not absolute. Having a right to life is not a guarantee when that right violates other people’s rights. Secondly, I will rely on the concept of self-defense. It is arguably allowable to kill if such action is done in self-defense. In the same way, the mother may secure an abortion where the fetus threatens her life.
Thomson argues that some opponents of abortion would seldom make an exception, even in cases where the continued sustenance of that pregnancy poses a risk to the life of the mother. Several issues arise when considering a circumstance where a pregnancy puts the mother's life at risk. The first issue regards the right to life. In this circumstance, both the mother and the unborn child have a right to life. Since the right to life cannot be weighed, the best conclusion to make seems to be that both the mother and the child have an equal right to life. Consequently, a mother cannot use the concept of her right to life as the basis upon which to carry out an abortion.
Thomson continues to argue that the above argument comes from the assumption that the concept of the right to life is unproblematic. To most people, it appears that the right to life is a simple principle that should always be observed. Thompson asserts that the right to life is not a simple principle and that such an assumption brings forth a mistake. She continues to argue that we must ask ourselves what the right to life pertains to (Thomson, 437). Some would view the right to life as the right to have the basic minimums required to sustain life. This view raises an intriguing argument when one considers a possibility where the bare minimum to support life is something one has no right to. To accentuate this matter, she revisits the analogy of the violinists. She argues that although the violinist needs another person’s kidneys for survival, they have no such right. It would only be out of the benevolence of the person to allow the violinist such use of kidneys.
Thomson continues to expose the issues arising from the principle of the right to life by shedding light on another view. She argues that yet another group of people view the right to life as the right not to be killed by anybody. This view opens up a portal of difficulties. In the case of the violinist, for instance, it would mean that everybody must refrain from doing something that might lead to his death. Consequently, that would give the violinist right over another person’s kidneys. Thomson argues that this view is, therefore, impractical since allowing the violinist to use the kidneys should only be viewed as an act of kindness rather than granting him a right (Thomson, 438).
Considering these arguments, Thomson concludes that having the right to life does not automatically guarantee a person the continued use of another person’s body. Consequently, those who rely on the r...