International Protection of Human Rights and Rawls’ Theorization of Difference

On page 26 of Political Liberalism, John Rawls writes:
“The reason the original position must abstract from and not be affected by the contingencies of the social world is that the conditions for a fair agreement on the principles of political justice between free and equal persons must eliminate the bargaining advantages that inevitably arise within the background institutions of any society from cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies.”
Though Rawls notes that there are other differences that are rooted in identity, status, and natural cognitive abilities, he sets forth a political model of democratic deliberation that is primarily aimed at addressing how individuals who subscribe to different philosophical belief systems and world views (“comprehensive doctrines”) might come to an agreement on political matters. Rawls specifies that he is not explicitly dealing with differences rooted in identity (e.g., race, class, age) because it assumes that the individual can easily disregard these differences in their employment of “public reason.”
Drawing on the writings of Silvia Federici and Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, how might feminist scholars and activists problematize and critique the above quote? In what ways might they argue that the “justice as fairness” model of deliberative democracy that Rawls sets forth is itself an ideology and/or comprehensive doctrine? Additionally, how might they critique Rawls’s understanding and theorization of difference? Do you think that they might problematize the way that Rawls separates differences based in comprehensive doctrines from those based in identity? If so, why?
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