Freedom and Necessity, Concept of a Person, Subjectivity of Values and Absurdity of Life

Philosophy
Name
Institution
1. A. J. Ayer: Freedom and Necessity
According to Ayer, people are not as free as it might be thought. While people are thought to be acting out of free will, this is not the case when one is constrained to act only in certain ways. For instance, a person might have someone else obtain a habitual ascendancy over him. In this case, one does not question on whether to act in the way the other person wants. A person in this case is under the influence of the other person. He is not free to decide how to behave but rather has his decisions predetermined because he has to consider the interests of the other person over his. This leads to a situation of strong obedience to the extent that a person does not have the chance of deciding whether or not to do as the other person wants. This way, one is not free because he has to behave or act in a certain way. Since a person has to explain his actions in terms of why he chose to behave in a certain manner over another, he is not free but rather constrained. It is true that no one is forcing a person to behave in a certain manner; implying that no one is holding a gun to force a person. However, since one would be expected to explain his decisions and also has to consider the consequences of his actions, he is not free. The agent is therefore either merely constrained or caused to act as she does, which fits in the overall argument of freedom or necessity (Ayer, 1963).
2 B. Harry Frankfurt: Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
For Frankfurt, being free is something that does not apply to all animals. Instead, it is something that is enjoyed only by human beings and thus distinguishes them from other animals. He starts by arguing that while different animals have desires and motives as well as freedom in making choices, humans have a peculiar characteristic; second-order desires. While all animals including human beings want and choose to be moved to do something, human beings have a higher capacity; of deciding whether to have or not to have certain motives and desires. While all animals have first-order desires in that they can simply desire or not desire to do something, human beings have the capacity of reflective self-evaluation; something manifested in second-order desires. This means that while all animals can only desire to do something or not do it, human beings are a bit special as they can decide whether to desire or not to desire to do what every animal can do. It is therefore arguable that what animals enjoy is not freedom of the will. While it is true that they are free to do what they want, this is not enough condition to having free will. This means that the condition dogs have is not free will. Even though dogs are constituted to first-order desires, the fact that they lack second-order desires deprives them of free will. Personhood in this case is therefore about having first-order desires as well as second-order desires. Since a person can secure aligning his will to second-order volitions, he exercises freedom of the will ...