Ethical Case: Ford Pinto Saga

Ethical Case: Ford Pinto Saga
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Ethical Case: Ford Pinto Saga
Synopsis
Historically, engineering failures from the Johnstown Flood in 1889 to the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster have been caused by design errors, safety protocols, and construction problems. While the blame always rests on miscommunication, ignorance, and negligence, professional engineers have learned that the worst engineering failures and disasters have a strong relationship with ethics. Between 1971 and 1976, the Ford Motor Company manufactured and sold over 2.2 million Ford Pintos (Case Western Research University, 2022). Ford had settled to produce the most affordable and competitive car to compete with the "made in Japan" cars whose quality was as low as their price. In 1971, Ford decided to reduce the production time of Pinto from three-and-half years to two. However, towards the late stages of design development, engineers at Ford noticed an issue with Pinto's fuel tank. The tested prototypes also failed the 20 mph rear-end impact and had dangerous leaks and raptured gas tanks. According to the engineers, the fuel tank would rupture in rear-end collisions even at very low speeds (Lee, 1998). Due to the car's design, the tank between the bumper and the rear axle could easily rupture and cause a fire. Immediately, Ford engineers recommended a quick and simple fix to the issue, but it would cost the company an additional $11 per car. However, Ford's management decided that the production should proceed to maintain a low production cost and avoid delays.
A few years later, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) launched investigations of accidents that involved Pinto catching fire. While these investigations did not spot the faults in Pinto, "Mother Jones" magazine provided details about the safety risks of Pinto to the public and the prior knowledge of Ford's executives about the problem. Mark Dowie of Mother Jones magazine published an influential article in 1977 detailing the accusations of Ford Motor executives of manufacturing and continuing to sell the Pinto, which he referred to as a "firetrap," even after knowing it (Lee, 1998). According to Dowie, Ford's decision was reached following a cost/benefit analysis that a few lawsuits by burn victims and their families would cost the company less than the $11 that was required to fix each car. Strickland and his colleague from NHTSA maintained that Pinto had a "fire threshold" in rear-end collisions of 30-35 miles per hour. The federal standard on the integrity of fuel tanks was 30 miles per hour rear impact, meaning that NHTSA needed other measures to implement a recall of the cars. However, based on Dowie's article and the public pressure, Strickland's team labeled Pinto unsafe even after meeting the NHTSA standards. This declaration was made following crash tests that Pinto failed and instead burst into flames after an impact. Ford later lost a lawsuit, recalled the cars in 1978, and fixed the Pintos with the solution initially recommended by its engineers (Case Western Research University, 2022). It is estimated that the engineering failure at Ford claimed between 27 and 180 lives.
Ethical Analysis
While the Pinto case had legal i...