The Cold War Era

In the wake of Vietnam, Airmen sought to learn from the war's perceived mistakes to prevent them from occurring in the future. Two very different concepts emerged during the 1970s and 1980s. The first concept, known as AirLand Battle, evolved under the leadership of Gen Bill Creech in the late 1970s and 1980s. Some in the USAF believed the major function of air and space forces was to attack an enemy's fielded forces across the depth of the battlespace. Much of the early planning for air operations in support of OPLAN 1002-90 - the first Gulf War - reflected this focus. Other theorists developed ideas that sought to reinvent the classic emphasis of airpower on strategic roles and missions.

Colonels John Boyd and John Warden developed very different theories that sought the same result: to paralyze the enemy's ability to control its levers of power. Through a series of presentations refined over several years, Colonel Boyd developed the Observe- Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop based upon theories of psychology, behavior and decision-making. Col John Warden believed in directly attacking the leadership and the supporting infrastructure upon which it relies.

Like Boyd, Warden believed the US could create conditions where the adversary's leadership would be unable to control its forces, leaving capitulation as their only option. Although one could argue strategic attack was part of the bombardment theory that evolved from ACTS' earliest teachings, Warden's modern approach attempted to integrate precision technologies to achieve effects as never before.

Soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Col Warden and a small group of planners on the Air Staff developed a strategic attack plan designed to achieve national objectives. Key planners such as Col Warden and then Lt Col Dave Deptula believed that the combination of stealth and precision enabled the USAF to bypass enemy ground forces and attack what they considered the enemy's true center of gravity. They, along with others, developed a plan they called INSTANT THUNDER. The "INSTANT" reflected their belief that through this plan they could achieve the President's objectives in as little as a week. Although this was not the plan that was finally executed, Lt Col Deptula took the concepts behind INSTANT THUNDER further, and codified the concepts of parallel warfare and effects- based operations during the early planning for air operations that would culminate in Operation DESERT STORM.

Then-Lt Gen Horner, the first joint force air component commander (JFACC), was concerned with the ability of US forces to stop Iraqi forces if they invaded Saudi Arabia. While he recognized the importance of strategic attack, he realized air and space power were all the US had in place to repulse an Iraqi incursion. He did not ignore the strategic attack, but his initial focus was on halting the Iraqis. With Lt Col Deptula as his chief offensive planner, Lt Gen Horner incorporated much of INSTANT THUNDER's approach into Phase I of CENTCOM's four-phased plan for ODS. Air and space power were preeminent in the first three phases, and had a significant role in the final phase. Many believed Operation DESERT STORM vindicated early airpower theorists who believed airpower was a decisive force that could unilaterally achieve national objectives.