Stuxnet and Flame Worms: Nuclear Power Plant Generator

Stuxnet and Flame Worms
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Institution
Stuxnet and Flame Worms
Introduction
The last ten years has seen an increase in the literature detailing about cyber crime. This discussion has been spurred by the unprecedented release of computer malware that is intended to harm the computer programs of other nations or individuals. One of the most prominent literatures on computer malware is the one touching on the Stuxnet and Flame Worms that were used by the United States and Israel to shut the Iranian Nuclear Power Plant Generator (Farwell, & Rohozinski, 2011). This paper examines the original design, functionality, and applications of the malware and how it is used to compromise the target.
The Stuxnet worm that was used together with Flame to destroy the Iranian nuclear plant was specifically meant to attack industrial control systems. The main aim of the worm is to alter the code operating in Programmable Logic Controls (PLCs) in order to cause them to depart from their expected behavior. In the Iranian case, this deviation was meant to be minimal and only noticeable after a long period of time. The creators took greater care while developing the worm to ensure that they incorporated programs that look like ordinary computer programs thus making it even easier to install on the target computers (Farwell, & Rohozinski, 2011).
In the Iranian case, the target was specifically the Siemens Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems aiming very definite industrial functions. The Stuxnet worms is intended to infect the project files of the Siemens WinCC/PC 7 SCADA control software and disrupts the communiqué between the WinCC operating in Windows and the affixed PLC devices when the two are interlinked through a data cable. This kind of attack is used called a ‘man in the middle attack’ as it can only be introduced physically through a cable. The initial infection of the Windows computer may be accomplished by just plugging in a USB flash drive or through an inside network if there is an infected machine from within the system (Faisal, & Ibrahim, 2012).
The design of Stuxnet was meant to place its focus on locating definite slave variable-frequency drives linked to the Siemens S7-300 system. In addition to this, it is indicated that it was meant to attack only a certain provider of the PLC systems. In this case, it was the systems that had originated from Vacon and Fararo Paya. The worm is however more definite as it spies on the frequency of the affixed motors and then attacks only those systems that orbit within a certain range. The worm then mounts on the PLC that examine the Profibus of the system and in certain circumstances it regularly changes that frequency something that caused the motors operating within that frequency to change the speech in which they operate. In the Iranian case, the worm installed an industrial rootkit which is the first in history. This rootkit was meant to fake the industrial process control sensor signals thus making it impossible for the system to shut down due to the detection of abnormal behavior. This function together with the production of legitimate data results made the Iranian authorities unable to detect the exact problem at ...