Limitations and Gaps on Legislations Related to Cyber-Stalking

Cyber-Stalking
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Cyber-Stalking
Legislation Related to Cyberstalking
The U.S. recognizes cyberstalking as a serious offense and provides mechanisms against this crime through federal legislation - 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2). Major (2012) indicates that Congress enacted the legislation in 1996. The popularly termed Interstate Stalking Statute rose as a section of the Act for violence against women. The law indicates that it is unlawful for any individual to participate in diverse activities involving electronic communication to create a scenario that leaves other American persons to reasonably fear for their lives. It also includes any threats to bodily harm, including themselves or other people or animals. The legislation also covers elements that induce substantial psychological distress. The law’s phrasing emphasizes the course of conduct to denote that the person engages in two or more cyberstalking-flagged acts (McAndrew, 2014). This persistency emerges as a conclusive indication that the offender has an increased probability of sustaining the behavior in the long term. For this federal law to consider the act committed by an individual as sufficient for classification as cyberstalking, it must directly relate to or become associated with harassing, killing, intimidating, injuring, or surveilling other Americans with the primary purpose of executing the listed harms. The law remains applicable for individuals involved in interstate travels, engaging in foreign commerce, or residing within the United State’s territorial jurisdiction and special maritime zone.
Limitations and Gaps Related to the Legislation
This legislation provides the U.S. federal courts with justifiable reasons for ordering pretrial confinements to protect victims against stalking. However, the primary limitation is that this law becomes significantly derailed by the United States’ first amendment. The challenge is that the First Amendment fails to protect the victims against all expressive acts (Major, 2012). For instance, it does not protect against fighting words, obscenity, commercially-inclined speech, or liberal ones. Critics have also flagged issues such as threatening conversations remaining beyond the coverage of the protections enshrined in the First Amendment. Major (2012) acknowledges that 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2) remains a significant challenge in addressing the complex and dynamic forms of cyberstalking as part of its facial challenges that render it partially overbreadth and vague. These concerns include distressing speech, discourses on public concern matters, and threats. Thus, although this legislation targeted cyberstalking, it required further amendments to address these drawbacks.
A case precedent, Hill v. Colorado, addressed content neutrality in 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2). Major (2012) indicates that a First Amendment assessment renders this statute facially invalid. Based on the facts of the case, the court determined that it was content-neutral because it was not a speech regulation. Instead, it sought to control where the speech occurred. Moreover, it fails to refer to the speech conte...