The Cyber Kill Chain

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The Cyber Kill Chain
Lockheed developed the cyber kill chain to stop cyber attacks. It breaks down each step of a malware assault into seven distinct phases that defenders might follow to identify and thwart the attack. The cyber kill chain is a popular structure from which businesses can begin to construct a cybersecurity plan. Despite its popularity and prevalence, the cyber kill chain has a number of significant and potentially catastrophic problems. Because the model has not been updated since it was first developed roughly ten years ago, these vulnerabilities in its security have persisted. It is essential to examine why people think the cyber kill chain is not good enough and does not cover everything.
The model's layout accomplishes the goals for which it was created: malware protection and detection. The issue is that there are other security risks in the modern environment than malware. However, the model does not successfully identify or counteract dangers when used for threat assessment and prevention. It is because the attack's first stages took place outside of the secured network. The Cyber Chain's flaws were discovered in 2013 after only two years since the model's inception. The United States senate investigated the Lockheed-cyber chain framework in 2013 and found a target retail company had had a security compromise. The United States Senate claimed that the various protocol restrictions at each level did little to stop or stop the progression of attacks. The cyber chain model needs something additional to tackle the sophisticated cyber dangers of today if it couldn't manage them in 2013 (Khan et al., 601). The issue with the concept is that it solely addresses malware prevention and takes a dated approach to network security.
In addition, the Cyber Kill Chain does not identify any potential insider threats. The model cannot recognize dangers posed by insiders or intrusions made via remote access. It is because there is no virus or payload included in these threats. In these circumstances, the kill chain model design is useless because it can only detect and prevent malware. The list of dangers that can compromise network security but are not covered by the effectiveness of the cyber kill chain is extensive and drawn out (Kim et al., 160). To appropriately identify these threats that are outside the scope of the cyber kill chain, the first step is to recognize strange events in user behaviors, subnets, machines, and applications. To accomplish this, one must conduct a behavioral profile analysis on the users and the actions they perform.
The cyber kill chain model does not account for ...