Moral Permissibility of Eating Animals

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The Moral Permissibility of Eating Animals
The moral quandaries surrounding the consumption of animals have ignited a fervent and contentious discourse in recent times. Alastair Norcross and Christine Korsgaard have presented compelling arguments asserting that eating animals is morally impermissible. Their reasoning is based on the existence of specific individuals, known as marginal cases, who lack the capacity for moral reflection and the understanding that animals are capable of experiencing and comprehending suffering, respectively. While these viewpoints offer a refreshing perspective, they have yet to be without scrutiny. This paper aims to analyze Norcross' and Korsgaard's arguments critically and the objections raised against them to assess the moral permissibility of consuming animals.
According to Norcross, the moral permissibility of consuming animals is questionable due to the marginal cases of humans who lack the capacity for ethical reflection. Norcross challenges the traditional belief that rationality is the morally relevant distinction between humans and animals on three grounds: the failure to acknowledge that some humans are incapable of moral reflection, the oversight of reciprocity as the core of morality, and the inability to establish the moral significance of this distinction in relation to animals' status as moral patients versus moral agents (Puppies, Pigs, and people, 239). Equally, Christine Korsgaard's argument is rooted in treating animals with respect and dignity. She argues that using animals merely as a means to an end is degrading and violates their rights as fellow creatures. She says, “… most of the things that human beings do to non-human animals that come up for moral scrutiny are natural acts,” thus, we should not take it as evidence that these actions are not wrong (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 98). Furthermore, any action that causes animal suffering is considered morally wrong and not permissible.
A counterargument to Norcross' stance posits that animals do not possess the capability for moral contemplation and, therefore, cannot be expected to exhibit moral responsibility. Carl Cohen argues that “the issue is one of kind… What humans retain when disabled, animals have never had (Puppies, Pigs, and People, 239).” This conveys the nature of human beings as superior to animals, which brings about a different relationship dynamic. As a result, assigning animals a different moral status is likely redundant compared to humans, as they are of other species. Still, this objection fails to acknowledge the undeniable reality that animals undergo suffering and pain, thereby requiring their treatment with reverence and empathy, regardless of their incapacity for moral responsibility. Although animals may lack moral reflection, they are capable of perceiving and understanding suffering, thus prohibiting their treatment as mere expendable tools.
One objection to Korsgaard's argument regarding animals’ lack of moral rights is based on their inability to re...