Warfare Studies: Character of War and the Nature of War

Provide a 150 word minimum response to each of the 2 postings of the classmates in regards to questions A and C.

Please note you can agree or disagree in your response with any of the responses from the classmates as long as you back it up with explanation and facts. You must use at least 1 source from class readings for each response at minimum and 2 other sources from class or outside of class.

In-text citations must be done in accordance with Global College Style Guide attached and not APA. (Questions A and C responses below have done citations appropriately).

QUESTION A: Today, the U.S. and its allies face threats as varied as insurgency, terror, cyber, hybrid, conventional, and even nuclear war. Do these describe changes to the very nature of war? Or, is it the character of war that is changing? How does Great Power Competition influence these threats and how do they influence Great Power Competition?

QUESTION C: If you were to write a 21st century version of On War what would be the key factors that you would say define war and why? How does your new version of On War help us to better understand Great Power Competition?

Justify and support your answer using your experience and source support from the assigned readings.

Classmates responses:

C’s response to Question A:

The various threats of insurgency, terror, cyber, and conventional warfare explain a change in the character of war. As Beyerchen describes, the nature of war is driven by psychological forces without limit to gain an advantage over an adversary (Beyerchen 1992, 9). Regardless of the warfare method, the goal of these threats is to gain an advantage over the U.S. and allies. The nature of war is unchanging in this regard.

The character of war changes significantly and Great Power Competition provides a framework for immense changes to warfare. The character of war definition identifies the significant difference between insurgency and terrorism versus Great Power Competition and conventional warfare. With the overall goal of peace, the character of war adapts to the requirements. Clausewitz describes two objectives of war, destroy the enemy forces, and disarm the enemy (Clausewitz 1976, 2). Destroying enemy forces can still leave the state with a military, but disarming the enemy is characterized more as total warfare (Clausewitz 1976, 2). Great Power Competition will require more resources and effort which is in turn influenced through political means.   

S's response to Question C:

Clausewitz likens the nature of war to that of a duel in its simplest form.  However, he is careful to clarify that this comparison is to be made to that of a wrestling match.  He lays out in the first book of On War that there exists a trinity of forces that define the nature of war and that they are Passion, Reason, and Probability.  For the wrestler these are easy to identify as the Will, Purpose, and Skill.  How strongly the wrestler desires to partake (commitment to exertion of effort,) the reason for his undertaking (team loyalty, or perhaps preservation of honor,) and his skill compared to his opponent (which helps to define the probability of success) are all factors which compel the wrestler to choose to embark on the gamble of wrestling under threat of a loss.  War is similarly, according to Clausewitz, a gamble in which the Will (or the Passion of the people against an enemy,) the reason (purpose and rationale of government policy,) and the capability of the armed services (skill) establish a three legged stool upon which the choice to gamble on the outcome of war is based. 

This is essentially true still of the nature of War.  What is important to understand about this model is that there are essentially only two paths by which taking the gamble of war is logically sound.  First, the perception of the probability of a favorable outcome is so high that the risk appears to be worth the reward.  Or second, the outcome of refraining from the gamble of war is perceived to be so unacceptable that war is the only alternative.  Therefore, in the most basic of terms, the most effective path to victory in war must be to understand and exploit the construct of the enemy's Clausewitzian Triad.

For case one, victory should be achieved by making the cost for the enemy so great that the reward is no longer worth the expense (in lives, and treasure.)  The United States experienced this both in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

For case two, victory is achieved by making the war so unacceptable for the enemy that it becomes more unacceptable than the outcome of surrender that originally motivated the undertaking in the first place.  The United States victory over Japan in 1945 is a good example of this.

Either of these two strategic paths to victory in war, tiring the wrestler until he quits, or making the match more unbearable than the impending loss, can be achieved by exploiting one, two, or all three of the enemy's Clausewitzian Triad.

Perhaps the only two differences between today and Clausewitz's time is that the beginning of war is less defined and the outcome of war is more detestable because of the destructive power of modern weapons.  Grey zone operations today between Great Power Competitors are nothing more than attacks short of war on an adversary's capabilities, will to fight, and rationale for war.  Interestingly, however, the destructive power of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical weapons has changed the calculus of the gamble a government must accept before partaking in war.  In almost no case is the risk of Nuclear Destruction better than capitulation to an adversary, which, for the past 80 years has effectively limited wars to regional, and non-total wars.

References:

1. Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War

2. Bellinger, "The Trinity" Lecture. Air University. (2022)