Answering the questions. Social Sciences Coursework

1. A2006storyintheInternationalHeraldTribunestatedthefollowing:
“Dutch political parties began the complicated task of forming a new gov- ernment on Thursday, one day after national elections thrust the Netherlands into the same kind of inconclusive terrain that Austria and Germany experi- enced in their votes. Austria has yet to form a government after its election two months ago, and in Germany last year, it took six weeks of grueling ne- gotiations to form a coalition government under Angela Merkel.”
How would you explain what this means to a roommate or family member who has no idea what a parliamentary government is? Your explanation should include what the government is, how it forms, what factors affect how long this formation process takes, who gets into government, and so on.
2. Spatial models have a variety of applications. Let’s use one to examine the effects of judicial review. In our model, a bureaucratic agency, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), sets the initial policy. If the agency’s policy is not challenged by the legislature or the courts, then
Due Friday, Dec 11 · 11:59pm
the policy prevails.
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Suppose we have three actors: a legislature, a legislative committee, and a regulatory agency. Suppose the legislature has delegated supervision of the regulatory agency to the legislative committee. In Figure 1, we show the ideal points of the median member of the legislature (L), the median member of the legislative committee (LC), and the regulatory agency (A). The agency makes the first move by choosing a policy position. If it wishes, the legislative committee can initiate legislation to alter the agency’s policy. If it does so, legislation is sent to the floor of the legislature, where it can be amended freely. If the committee does not wish to initiate legislation, then the policy chosen by the agency stands. As always, you should assume that all actors have single-peaked preferences, and that they will vote over alternatives sincerely.
(a) Ifthelegislaturegetsachancetoamendaproposalfromthelegislative committee, what will the outcome of the amendment process be? In other words, where will the legislature set policy if it gets the chance?
(b) Whatistherangeofpoliciesthatthelegislativecommitteewouldprefer to the policy outcome that the legislature would choose in an amendment process?
This model is loosely based on one by Ferejohn and Shipan (1990, 3), who argue that policymaking by bureaucratic agencies is the ordinary or routine decision-making practice throughout modern government. Relatively few governmental decisions are directly mandated by government acts. For the most part, statutes serve as constraints on what bureaucrats can do rather than as detailed directives. Thus, while not denying the importance of the classical statutory model of democratic government—in which a democratically elected legislature instructs its delegates in public action—it seems likely that a model of administrative action that puts agency actions at the front is more relevant for explaining government action most of the time.
(c) Given your answer to (b), when will the legislative committee initiate legislation to alter the agency’s policy? When will the legislative com- mittee not initiate legislation to alter the agency’s policy? In your own words, explain your answers.
(d) Wheredoyouthinktheagencyshouldinitiatepolicysothatitwillnot
be overturned?
Now suppose we add a fourth actor: a court. Assume that the court has
the ability to review agency actions and can strike them down if it wants
to. If this happens, policy reverts to some status quo policy that we will la- 22
bel SQ. After the court has decided whether to strike down the agency’s Ferejohn and Shipan (1990) refer to this as
policy, the committee can choose to initiate new legislation if it wants to. If it does so, legislation is sent to the floor of the legislature, where it can be amended freely, as in the Agency Policymaking model that we just examined. In Figure 2, we show the status quo reversion point (SQ) and the ideal points of the median member of the legislature (L), the median member of the legislative committee (LC), the regulatory agency (A), and the median judge on the court (C).
(e) Supposethecourtdecidestostrikedowntheagency’spolicy(wherever it might be). If this happens, policy will revert to the status quo point shown in Figure 4. How will the legislative committee react? Will it ini- tiate legislation to change the status quo policy? If the legislative com- mittee does initiate legislation to change the status quo policy, what will the legislature do? What will the final policy position be in this situation if the court decides to strike down the agency’s policy?
(f) In the previous question, we did not specify where the agency would implement policy. Let’s suppose that the agency chooses to implement its policy at 3.1 on the left-right issue dimension. Would the court prefer to have policy at 3.1 or at the final policy position you found in part (e)?
the Statutory Review model.
Figure 2: Statutory Review model
In other words, if the agency chooses to implement policy at 3.1, will the court want to strike it down? Explain your answer.
(g) Does the presence of a court with the power of judicial review move policy toward or away from the ideal point of the median voter in the legislature? Hint: compare the final policy outcome from the Agency Policymaking model without a court and the final outcome in the Statu- tory Review model.
(h) Some worry that judicial review is antidemocratic because judges are making policy instead of the people’s elected representatives in the leg- islature. In the particular model of judicial review that we have exam- ined, should people be worried by the antidemocratic nature of judicial activism? Explain your answer.