Role of Air Power Leaders, Deterrence and Escalation, and No Fly Zones

Coursework Instructions:

Please provide a response to the following 3 questions (A,B, AND C) stating if you agree or disagree. Please use sources to support your answer. Please see the assignment attached.
*When you place your in-text citation within the answer, please input your page number where you found the information. Example: (Hodges 2003, 176)., Hodges (2003, 176) discussed..., In a 2003 article, Hodges (176) discussed.
Please see all other source’s attached and please make sure you site the correct articles within each response. The instructor will be looking for citations to support the argument.
Required Source:
https://www(dot)realcleardefense(dot)com/articles/2019/07/10/thinking_about_space_deterrence_and_china_114569.html
https://thestrategybridge(dot)org/the-bridge/2019/1/14/no-fly-zones-and-the-evolution-of-coercive-airpower-application
https://www(dot)rand(dot)org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR423/RAND_RR423.pdf

QUESTION A: Eliot Cohen stated, "Airpower is an unusually seductive form of military strength, in part because...it appears to offer gratification without commitment." Consider how airpower's capabilities have potentially made it the "easy call" for political decision makers.

In this light, consider the proper role of airpower leaders as they advise civilian leadership. In John Garofano's article, "Deciding on Military Intervention: What is the role of senior military leaders?," he uses (and commends) the example of GEN Matthew Ridgway, who avoided recommending particular courses of action and simply reported the real costs of serious military commitment. Do you agree with the author that Ridgway's example is the best approach for senior airpower leaders? Why or why not?

QUESTION B: In this course, you have examined the concepts of escalation management and deterrence across a variety of contexts and domains. Three readings, in particular, have been at the center of this examination: Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century, pages 159-172 and 174-176, “Deterrence and Escalation in Cross-domain Operations: Where Do Space and Cyberspace Fit?,” and “Thinking About Space Deterrence and China."

In “Deterrence and Escalation in Cross-domain Operations: Where Do Space and Cyberspace Fit?,” Manzo posits we have a more established framework for deterrence and escalation from the nuclear cold war era as well as traditional conventional operations, but lack a common understanding of deterrence and escalation in the space and cyber domains, being without a shared framework for analyzing how concepts such as proportionality, escalation, credibility, and deterrence apply when capabilities in space and cyberspace not only enable operations in other domains but also are part of the battlefield.

Considering Manzo’s assertions and your course readings, propose two succinct guiding principles, or key considerations—one for space, and one for cyber—that would support a framework for deterrence and managing escalation in multi-domain operations. Support and defend your proposed principles with specific examples.

NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY: The concept of integrating and synchronizing operations across multiple domains in order to achieve unified action is not new, but has recently seen new terms associated with it. You may read or hear references to “cross-domain,” “multi-domain,” or “all-domain.” For our purposes, the same consistent concept goes with these terms, and use of any of them is acceptable.

QUESTION C: In his article, “No Fly Zones and the Evolution of Coercive Airpower Application,” Torkelson argues that, “The universe of no-fly zones, or air exclusion zones, illustrate that risk strategies of limited, incrementally applied military force, particularly from the air, can achieve strategic political outcomes.” He supports his argument with the historical examples of no-fly zones in Bosnia, Iraq, and Libya.

Considering this article with Mueller’s article, “Denying Flight: Strategic Options for Employing No-Fly Zones” in lesson two, how compelling is the historical evidence to support the effectiveness of no-fly zones as a coercive strategy in achieving political outcomes? Would a no-fly zone coercive strategy have been effective in Syria? Why or why not? Support and defend your answer?

Justify and support your answer using your experience and source support from the assigned readings.

Coursework Sample Content Preview:

Discussion Questions Responses
Student’s Name
Course
Date
Discussion Questions Responses
Section A Response
General Ridgeways is one exceptional example of a military leader holding a senior position who provides an objective and comprehensive assessment of properties. His assessments have indeed been helpful for the National Security Council, enabling them to approximate the risks and costs involved in military interventions in areas such as Indochina. I agree that airpower’s capabilities have potentially made it the “easy call” for political decision-makers. The senior leaders in the American government have failed to outline the limitations and costs of airpower. The efficiency of airpower makes it a safe, convenient, and easy means of transport for the military. However, airpower also has drawbacks, such as the high costs involved. However, its ability to sustain the use of weapons and reduce the risk of harm among civilians makes airpower a more accessible option for politicians to address issues that need military intervention. The American government has a responsibility to ensure the safety of its states through measures that eliminate safety threats from the freedom to use air power.
According to Torkelson (2019, 2), America, under the leadership of President Obama, had to put into consideration the need to implement a no-fly zone as a safety measure against attacks from its enemies. This came up after threat speculations from Syria and Russia. The step aimed to safeguard American territories from attacks. Although airpower aids in safeguarding the safety of many nations, its misuse could result in adverse outcomes globally. Regulating the use of airpower is critical in helping America to manage any potential conflicts to prevent them from escalating to serious war (Torkelson 2019, 3). While America is a superpower, other nations such as Russia have emerged due to technological advancements that equip them with high-tech airpower that could potentially cause war.
Section B Response
Manzo acknowledges the existence of a more established framework for deterrence and escalation from the nuclear cold war era as well as traditional conventional operations. However, the framework needs a shared understanding of deterrence and escalation in the space and cyber domains. It is paramount to have a shared framework for analyzing how concepts such as proportionality, credibility, escalation, and deterrence apply when capabilities in space and cyberspace enable operations in other domains and are part of the battlefield. The slow and steady framework supports the deterrence framework and manages an escalation of events in multi-domain operations, especially in spaces and cyber. The framework is instrumental in addressing the problem of misunderstandings and miscalculations that result in catastrophic outcomes in space and cyber. The framework also takes into consideration all aspects of potential risks of dangers i...

Updated on January 26, 2024

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Role of Air Power Leaders, Deterrence and Escalation, and No Fly Zones

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