Welfare Economics

Welfare Economics
Your Name
Subject and Section
Professor’s Name
May 30, 2023

1. a.      Question 3(a)

To determine the outcome of the majority voting between the alternative policies X, Y, and Z, we need to compare the individual rankings and see which policy receives the most votes in each pair-wise comparison. (a)   Individual Rankings: A: X, Y, Z B: Y, Z, X C: Z, X, Y (i)                 Vote between policies X and Y: Based on the individual rankings, A prefers X over Y, B prefers Y over X, and C prefers X over Y. Therefore, the outcome of the vote between X and Y would be a tie, with one vote for X and one vote for Y.   (ii)              Vote between policies Y and Z: A prefers Y over Z, B prefers Z over Y, and C prefers Z over Y. Therefore, the outcome of the vote between Y and Z would be a win for policy Z, with two votes for Z and one vote for Y.   (iii)            Vote between policies Z and X: A prefers X over Z, B prefers X over Z, and C prefers Z over X. Therefore, the outcome of the vote between Z and X would be a win for policy X, with two votes for X and one vote for Z. The ranking of policies obtained through majority voting is not consistent (transitive) in this case. X beats Y, Y beats Z, but Z beats X. This violates transitivity. (iv)             The order in which alternative policies are paired off on ballots can affect the final outcome. Let's consider the two orderings you mentioned:

1. a.      Ordering 1: First vote between X and Y, then vote between X and Z.

Vote between X and Y: Tie (as determined in (i)) Vote between X and Z: A prefers X over Z, B prefers X over Z, and C prefers Z over X. Therefore, policy X would win this vote, with two votes for X and one vote for Z.  

1. b. &n...