Annotations on Maj Gen Grynkewich's Assertions

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7067550101600T00T7118985179705E00E5934075156845M00M603123073660I00IMITCHELL INSTITUTE
6488430367030p00p6431280360045s00s6350635345440o00o6302375325755r00r6233795300990e00e6152515262255A00A6082665192405r00r6022340143510o00o599821097790f00f710501565405s00s7059930119380e00e7044690159385i00i6982460199390d00d6922135247650u00u6879590281940t00t6814185309880S00S6709410346075e00e6637655360680c00c6565900367665a00aPolicy Papers
Air superiority and unity of command in its employment will remain critical to the success of future joint operations.
Achieving air superiority in the future requires realizing the ascent of information as a dominant factor in warfare. Building an architecture that integrates data to create decision-quality knowledge is key, and the ability to share it with sensor- shooters in every domain.
The Department of Defense must change its acquisition approach, or adversaries will outpace our air superiority capability development.
Foreword: Preserving 21st Century Air Superiority
A prerequisite for efective military operations in all domains for all service components—the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—air superiority is the sine qua non for successful coalition and joint force operations. Since the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, US and coalition military operations have enjoyed the advantage of going into combat against adversaries that possessed little to no capability to deny US operations in the air above them. Military operations for over 25 years in permissive airspace has led US national security leadership to become accustomed to operating with unchallenged air superiority. As a result of the condition of continuous air superiority for over a quarter of a century, a presumption of sufciency in air superiority force structure has built up. This has led to investment priorities dominated by near- term confict and wishful thinking about potential future threats, along with reductions in planned defense resources in deference to other discretionary spending. Over the last decade the US Department of Defense leadership has truncated investment in air superiority. Correspondingly, capacity of this critical capability has atrophied and is no longer sufcient to meet the needs of the current National Security Strategy. This condition may prove calamitous to US military operations in future confict. Beyond the elective, low intensity contingencies of the past 25 years, major regional confict that can dramatically afect critical US national interests are likely to occur. The question is not if, but when. In this paper, Brig Gen Alex Grynkewich clearly and concisely illustrates how he and his team of US Air Force professionals worked for over a year providing a way ahead to address this most critical conventional warfghting mission area.
Lt Gen David A. Deptula, USAF (Ret.) Dean, The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies
Many national
Introduction:
Controlling the Air in the 21st Century
While the American...