Evaluation of the Sorites Paradox in Philosophy

Philosophy
Name:
Institution:
One grain of wheat does not make a heap, it follows that two grains do not; and if two do not, then three do not; and so on (Sorites Paradox).
This paradox stipulates that one grain cannot form a heap and if one more gain is added we still do not have a heap and if more gain is added we still do not form a heap, when a million steps are conducted we still do not make the heap. This means that there is no number of grains that is sufficient to make a heap. It is, however, important to note that there would be no problem if we an exact and precise definition of a heap that would pinpoint the number of grains required to form the heap. Therefore, in this case, there is an unclear boundary between heap and no heap. Ideally, this is false because each added gain results into a distinguishable change regardless of how small the change is.
The stingy argument suggests that when one does not give any money to help other people is stingy and an individual cannot be referred to as non-stingy by making a donation of one penny. The argument further suggests that a person who makes a donation of $0.01 is still stingy and he who offers $0.02 is also stingy. According to this argument, when this process is repeated for a billion times, the person who contributes $10,000,000 is also stingy. This is wrong because there is a difference between a person who offers no money and one who donates $0.01. No matter whether the change is observable or not, there is usually a transitive difference. The problem with this solution is that it is subject to an epistemic issue where a small line between 0 and $0.01 mar not perceptible to human agents.
For example, Peter was born with a condition where he did not have hair, however, the hair has started growing. Assuming that the hair grows one by one, this means that when he has 1 hair on his head he still can be considered bald. The same applied when he has 2 hairs, 3 hairs, et cetera. Then he develops a patch of hair when hundreds of hair have grown, however, it is still superfalse that he is hairy. After several patches have grown, he becomes ambiguous in regard to having hair. At this point, the epistemic penumbra is experienced. Any more hair that grows from this point marks Peter as hairy and that will be supertrue as long as his hair keeps on growing. This situation demonstrates that there exists a sharp line that distinguishes a vague predicate formed at the penumbra where knowledge about the state of a predicate is not comprehensible. Still, it is understood that predicate persists ...