Answering the questions. Social Sciences Coursework

** Please use the single spaced - 5 pages,
I assigned this task for 10 pages of "double spaced",but it should be single spaced 5 pages
Section A. Concepts
Be clear and concise
1. What is a public good? Give an example.
2. What is a revolutionary threshold?
3. Distinguish between moral hazard and adverse selection.
4. What is the collective action problem?
5. What is Cordorcet’s paradox?
6. Briefly describe the two fundamental problems of authoritarian rule.
7. Distinguish between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.
8. Why is the use of repression to deal with social unrest a double-edged sword?
9. What is the principal-agent problem?
Section B. Short Answers
Good answers should be at least half or two-thirds of a single-spaced page long.
1. Suppose that there are two interest groups, A and B, trying to get the gov- ernment to change its policies by holding street protests. Group A has 5,000 members and group B has 10,000 members. Assume that each group’s protest will be successful if it gets 20 percent of its members marching in the streets. According to collective action theory, which interest group is most likely to get the government to change its policies? Explain your answer.
2. What does Kuran (1991) mean by the “predictability of unpredictability”? In your answer, be sure to discuss the preferences and processes that lead to revolutions.
3. In your own words, what is the fundamental implication of Arrow’s theo- rem? In your answer, be sure to describe the four fairness conditions.
4. Suppose you are a dictator facing domestic unrest. Compare and contrast the two general strategies of authoritarian control you might use to deal with the masses. In your answer, be sure to discuss the costs and benefits of each strategy.
[Bonus (6 points)] A group of 100 voters in Quahog are deciding between three candidates for mayor: Peter, Stewie, and Meg. No more Adam West; he’s weird. Here are the preferences of the voters:
35 voters: Peter ≻ Stewie ≻ Meg 33 Voters: Stewie ≻ Peter ≻ Meg 32 voters: Meg ≻ Stewie ≻ Peter
(a) Is there a Condorcet winner? If so, who is it? Explain your answer. [3 points]
(b) Suppose Quagmire proposes the following: We first vote between Pe- ter and Stewie, and the winner goes up against Meg. Who would win? Explain. [3 points]
Section C. Analytical Problems [60 points]
Show all of your work.
(a) Solve the subgame on the left, where the Regime doesn’t value its inter- national reputation, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? What is the expected outcome? What are the pay- offs that each player receives? [5 points]
(b) Solve the subgame on the right, where the Regime does value its inter- national reputation, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? What is the expected outcome? What are the pay- offs that each player receives? [5 points]
(c) In the two complete information versions of the Private Censorship Game, is it possible to see the Newspaper publish critical stories of the Regime and then be repressed? If yes, explain why? If not, explain why not? [4 points]
(d) What is the expected payoff for the Newspaper from “Suppress stories criticizing Regime”? Show your work. [5 points]
(e) What is the expected payoff for the Newspaper from “Publish stories criticizing Regime”? Show your work. [5 points]
(f ) Use the expected payoffs from the two previous questions to calculate the critical probability, p, at which the Newspaper will choose to publish stories criticizing the Regime rather than suppressing them. [5 points]
(g) If the Newspaper believes that the Regime doesn’t value its international reputation with a probability of 0.5, will it choose to publish critical articles,
will it suppress them, or will it be indifferent between these two actions? Explain. [3 points]
(h) If the Newspaper believes that the Regime doesn’t value its international reputation with a probability of 0.7, will it choose to publish critical ar- ticles, will it suppress them, or will it be indifferent between these two actions? Explain. [3 points]
(i) If the Newspaper believes that the Regime doesn’t value its international reputation with a probability of 0.4, will it choose to publish critical ar- ticles, will it suppress them, or will it be indifferent between these two actions? Explain. [3 points]
(j) Given what you’ve learned about the incomplete information game above, is it possible to see the Newspaper publish stories critical of the Regime and then be repressed? If yes, explain why. If not, explain why not. [4 points]
(k) In the original paper, the authors note that after they had implemented their study in 2014, the Russian legislature passed several laws restrict- ing free speech. In the context of the game that you have just solved, how would such information affect your estimation of p? If you were the Newspaper, how would this affect your actions? Explain. [6 points]
2. The following table shows the results from two regression models that ex- amine the effect of economic variables on the survival of democracy.
(a) What is the effect of economic development on the survival of democ- racy? Is this effect statistically significant? [4 points]
(b) What is the effect of economic growth on the survival of democracy? Did this effect occur by chance? [4 points]

(c) What is the effect of oil resources on the survival of democracy? Did this effect occur by chance? [4 points]
Bonus [1 point]. The most important thing you learned so far is:
(a) Revolutions. Can’t predict them, but we keep trying anyway.
(b) Totalitarianism. No human being should ever have to experience that.
(c) Math. It’s everywhere! And you thought political science was safe.
(d) It’s tough to be a dictator. Everyone wants to take your place.
(e) I don’t need no charity point.