Airpower Doctrine: Tactics, Technique, and Procedures (TTPs)

Prepared for United States Central Command Air Forces
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Map of Afghanistan
CHAPTER EIGHT
Operation Enduring Freedom was the first major war of the 21st cen- tury. It also was a defining moment for the still-nascent presidency of George W. Bush. Its outcome in bringing down the Taliban and de- stroying al Qaeda’s terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan validated the president’s decision to avoid leaping into a precipitous response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, even though the initial inclination, as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted early on, had been to lash out reflexively.1 Instead, the Bush administration laid the groundwork for retaliation systematically and carefully, exercising in the process what The Economist called “considerable amounts of skill, subtlety, leadership, and, above all, intelligence” both in building a coalition and in planning and conducting the campaign.2 In so do- ing, it surprised both its critics and, most likely, the terrorists as well, the latter of whom were, for the first time, put on the defensive and thrust into a reactive mode. The simultaneous initiation of strike and humanitarian relief operations helped contribute to a popular Afghan view of the United States as a liberator rather than an invader. It also helped prevent the emergence of a significant Afghan insurgent resis- tance to the U.S. military presence.
1 Anne Scott Tyson, “Why U.S. Is Moving So Deliberately,” Christian Science Monitor, Oc- tober 4, 2001.
2 “Closing In,” The Economist, September 29, 2001, p. 11.
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Planning for Enduring Freedom began as an exercise in coer- cion, with a view toward persuading the Taliban to turn over Osama bin Laden and his chief al Qaeda deputies. Soon thereafter, however, it became an exercise in brute-force regime takedown and active pur- suit of Taliban and al Qaeda fanatics to the bitter end as it became clear that the Taliban leaders would remain unyielding in this regard. As the war commenced on October 7, 2001, President Bush urged CENTCOM to “take high risks and push the envelope in prosecut- ing this campaign.”3 Although the war got off to a slow start due to weather-driven delays in inserting U.S. SOF teams into Afghanistan, the Taliban crumbled so rapidly in the end that the air offensive did not have discernible phases once its collaborative work with those teams began in earnest. Foreign affairs commentator Fareed Zakaria flatly concluded from the experience that “American air power today is an amazing weapon of war.”4
After the initial bombing ended and the interim Karzai govern- ment had been installed, it became clear to many that the war had indeed been another air power success story, as were Operations De- sert Storm, Deliberate Force, and Allied Force before it. Many lessons from the earlier Allied Force experience were duly honored and in- corporated, particularly the synergistic effect of using friendly ground forces for shaping enemy troop movement and cueing allied air power. By the end of Operation Anaconda in mid-March 2...