Pape’s Theory of Coercive Airpower and the Coercive Cyber and Air Strategies

DQ RESPONSES
Name
Course
Date
DQ Responses
Question A
I disagree with Mueller’s assessment of Pape’s theory of coercive airpower because it is highly unsubstantiated and less compelling. Pape explores numerous cases to build a robust argument that airpower never has and cannot deliver on its promise. It is true that using airpower against governments and their leaders is set to fail. However, this strategy has never been leveraged with the same focus and determination as other common military efforts, further diluting Mueller’s criticism of Pape (Mueller 1998, 190). I also believe that airpower will not continue to be a centrepiece of coercive strategy based on the shortcomings highlighted by Pape. The theorist argues that strategic bombing for decapitation and punishment does not coerce and cannot help achieve denial. This argument finds substantial support from failed historical attempts and efforts to leverage air attacks in the last century, including the strategic bombing of the Desert Storm, Vietnam, Korea, and World War II (Pape 1996, 65). Also, strategic air bombing cannot address critical global problems. Proponents of this approach perceive it as an alternative to the harsh realities of war. However, air bombing is a simple or cheap solution to highly sophisticated international challenges. Moreover, history does not offer satisfactory premises to defend the notion that striking vital nodes in transportation, communication, and electrical systems can bring easy and painless victory. The described case of Operation Desert Storm and the Spanish Civil War shows the historical irrelevance of air power as a strategic means of achieving modern military coercion. Designing and creating an advanced tactical aeroplane is just a fascinating and emotional initiative, especially for manufacturing industries, and not a strategic way of winning wars, as demonstrated by the delineated historical examples.
Question B
Coercive cyber strategies differ from coercive air strategies in terms of their coherence, efficiency, risks involved, and application. To be sure, coercive air strategies have significantly evolved to respond to specific needs and situations. Researchers are even forging a merger of space strategies and air power strategies, which appears to be an inevitable future development. In contrast, cyber strategies are highly incoherent, which is not surprising, especially given the area’s novelty (Gompert et al. 2015, 14). These strategies are a huge challenge to all warfare levels because they have not been accommodated and accepted in American warfare, unlike in air power. Moreover, cyber strategies are open for speculation on the importance of computers and advanced technologies, which is not the case in air strategies that have been historically used and proven. The US needs a clear and articulate theory of warfare and war that accommodates a comprehensive theory of cyber power, unlike air power, wh...