Security studies Life Sciences Coursework Research

Digging Deeper into the Cuban Missile Crisis
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Section I: Introduction
Russia remains largely a secret society to date, a trait the acquired from the USSR era. Operation Anadyr of 1962 was the level best demonstration of how secretive the USSR was, an operation that eventually ended up to be the Cuban Missile Crisis. The USSR leader Nikita Khrushchev's had learned of the U.S.’ strategic installation of missiles in Turkey in the prevailing Cold War between the country and the Soviets. The Soviet leader decided to leverage on the new ally he had found through the revolution in Cuba, Fidel Castro, who was also an enemy to the U.S. Operation Anadyr was aimed at ferrying and installing missiles in the Cuban territory, a country few miles away from the U.S.. The operation was undertaken using a strategy familiar with the Soviets, full of secrecy, denial, and deception. The U.S. was only able to detect the presence of ballistic missiles in the process of installation, courtesy of the flaws attributed to mainly Cubans. The U.S. political and military personal almost paid the price of their mistaken perception, cognitive biasness, and wrongful analysis that allowed the Soviet to successfully ferry the missiles and troops. This paper aims to unmask the several instances, where the U.S. got it all wrong in its perception of the deceptive operation from the Soviets and influences of cognitive biases on the assessment.[Paul J. Sanborn, Operation Anadyr (JSTOR, 1997).] [Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” accessed November 13, 2020, /library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no1/article06.html.] [Central Intelligence Agency.] [Central Intelligence Agency.]
Section II: Perceiving the Build Up and the Eventual Crisis
Mistaken Perception
The U.S. got it all wrong from the onset of the operation. The Soviets had their cover well taken care of, but the U.S., with its sophistication, had every reason to uncover them but failed for quite a remarkable period due to their mistaken perception. The U.S. had prior knowledge of the existing hostility with the Cubans. The growing friendship between the Soviets and the Cubans should have alerted the U.S. political and military personnel about the crocky deals between the two nations. Besides, the Soviets and the Cubans, under the leadership of Fidel Castro, had a common enemy, the U.S., and the close relationship between the two should have alarmed the U.S. Instead, the U.S. was duped into believing that the Soviets were offering industrial and agricultural aid to the Cubans. The Soviets were cunning enough to have the military men have their cover as agricultural specialists and equipment operatives, which was rather floppy because most of them had little or no prior knowledge in their areas of specialization in the cover. Had the U.S. been keen enough to interrogate the perceived agricultural and industrial aid, they would have been in a position to uncover the operation at an early stage.[Central Intelligence Agency.] [Central Intelligence Agency.]
During the period of Operation Anadyr, the soviets had made drastic changes in their policies on interna...