Social Sciences Case Study: What were the most important factors in the collection and analysis of intelligence that led to the failure to correctly assess the Iraqi WMD program?

What were the most important factors in the collection and analysis of intelligence that led to the failure to correctly assess the Iraqi WMD program?
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Introduction
In 2003, the United States of America public was informed that invading Iraq was aimed at eliminating the threat that Saddam Hussein posed to the Americans because he possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). However, the invasion and the justification given for the same remains the most controversial event in Bush’s administration as it focused on ‘war on terror’. Bush’s administration did not find any WMD in Iraq, implying that the threat was illusory and not imminent, and the U.S has continued paying a heavy price in treasure, blood, and diplomatic stature for what has been described as unnecessary action. Despite the damage imposed on Iraq including thousands of deaths, the WMD program was a great failure as the prewar assessments by Bush’s administration were wide off the mark.
Reasons for the Failure of the WMD Program
Collection failures were one of the major causes of the WMD program failure. According to Phythian (2006), the Senate Select Committee concluded that intelligence collection as one of the causes of the failure of the WMD intelligence. This was also supported by the findings of the Silberman-Robb report (2005), which concluded that there was no adequate information for the Intelligence Community to analyze and disseminate. Collectors and analysts relied on past assumptions and inferences that had been drawn based on the past intentions and behaviors of Iraq. The Intelligence Committee also over relied on the UNSCOM inspectors in the period 1991-1998 and failed to use the period to establish HUMINT sources to replace the inspectors if they departed. As such, this means that the Intelligence Committee failed to perform its duties effectively, leading to over reliance on old assumptions and lack of sources to replace any departed inspectors.
The groupthink diagnosis and analytical failures also contributed to the WMD program. Phythian (2006) adds that the U.S Intelligence Community (IC) analysts should take responsibility of the failed WMD program in Iraq. This was also supported by the findings of the Senate Select Committee and Silberman-Robb Report. The Senate Select Committee noted that the IC concluded that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear power program, but there was no intelligence to support this assessment. Despite the intelligence showing evidence of the purchase of dual-use equipment, there was no proof that the equipment was meant for use in a nuclear program (U.S. Congress 2004 cited by Phythian (2006)). Silberman-Robb (2005), as cited by Phythian (2006), added that the analysts failed to question the assumptions made and correctly apply their tradecraft as further contributions to the WMD program failure. This also implies that the Intelligence Community failed to authenticate the documents, paucity in information collection, and errors in factual and technical analysis by the Committee contributed to the failure of the program.
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