Philosophy: Ethics & Society Religion & Theology Essay

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Philosophy: Ethics and Society
Question 1: Enshrining Primary Rights Theories in Law
Alan Buchanan has considerable concerns that enshrining primary rights theories in law would result in adverse consequences. Primary Right Theories are the predispositions whose assertion is that "certain groups can have a (general) right to secede in the absence of any injustice."Such people's demands extend beyond the injustice part to include the nationalist principle and ascriptive characteristics as secession bases. Buchanan argues that such theories are very poor in facilitating reforms considering that they create perverse incentives. Primary Right Theories have abstract concepts as to why they should form a new state or nation and thus, in a major position to encourage behavior that undermines morality or, in this case, moral and sound principles of internal law. Also, they can be an obstacle to pursuing morally progressive strategies for conflict resolution. Finally, individual liberty or the government's greater efficiency are elements at stake.[Buchanan, Allen “Theories of Secession”, p.35]
On the other hand, David Copp argues that the question of whether we have a moral right to secession is "morally prior" to the question of whether international law ought to recognize such a right. In essence, this notion is opposite to Buchanan's arguments. First and foremost, Buchanan asserts that this predisposition is raised in an institutional vacuum, and if anyone happened to provide an answer, there would be little institutional response to it. Buchanan asserts that individuals such as David Copp have the overall assumption that assuming their position will form the basis upon reforming international institutions. Even though this is possible, it is highly predicated "upon whether the attractive features of non-institutional theories remain attractive when attempts are made to institutionalize them." As mentioned earlier, when the moral right to secede supersedes institutional morality and, more specifically, the international legal institutions and abiding principles, there are bound to be perverse incentives. Copp's position is only feasible if it "coheres with and builds upon the most morally defensible elements of existing law." Unfortunately, Copp's proposition is a non-institutional moral theory that fails to meet this criterion horrendously.[Ibid., p. 32] [Ibid., p. 32]
Alan Buchanan's perspective has sufficient arguments supporting his ideal, implying that his response is convincing. His arguments are objective and rely upon facts rather than depending on people's social-psychological state, which could at times be marred by significant bias. Decisions arrived at through the latter means lack validity and reliability. That is why Buchanan claims that such individuals are likely to place the new state under even more crisis than anticipated. Unreliable information of this nature cannot be relied upon in making the sound, logical and formidable steps forward. To this end, there is an unshakeable conviction that Buchanan's thinking is based upon reliable information that considers what is at stake and uses the data to make worthwhile conclusion...